The proposal by Dr. Deng Bol Aruai (DBA) for the secession of the Upper Nile region from South Sudan is fascinating. It is neither ridiculous nor is it acceptable. It is a double-edged sword. Looked at carefully, one can find a silver lining in the proposition not only for Upper Nile but for South Sudan. I will come back to this silver lining.
But it can also be a very
dangerous proposition. Meaning it can be used by power and ethnic entrepreneurs
and megalomaniacs to create elite-centered, infra-national, micro-states useful
for resource control. The interest of such people is not freedom, democracy or
the provision of services to the people. It is only the change of guards and
center of power.
This is what postcolonial
African leaders did. They fought European colonial powers only to become the
very colonial potentates and extractive politico-capitalists, quasi-foreigners
subjecting their people to the same control structures. As Frantz Fanon has
argued in The Wretched of the Earth, some freedom fighters were not fighting
the oppressor for freedom; they were fighting the oppressor for a chance to be like
the oppressor.
SPLM leaders, as many of
us are aware, have done the same thing. They got rid of Khartoum’s elite only
to assume the same oppressive and marginalizing governance modus operandi
in Juba.
In other words, Dr.
Deng’s proposal could provide a political, social and economic currency for
those whose interest are small fiefdom, some pseudo-feudal states they can
control.
Because I have not talked
to Deng Bol to ascertain the deeper social, political and economic issues
behind his proposal, I want to be circumspect about assuming his motives. I
will therefore leave my cautionary statement at that.
But the proposal can have
a silver lining: A chance for a deeper reflective, reflexive process. Why? People who want to protect the status quo
usually treat revolutionary ideas with disdain. Trying to understand either the
revolutionary proposal or the reason for which such proposals are suggested in
the first place serves no purpose for them. Instant disdain and categorical
rejections of such proposals are the first and only responses. Rationalizing
or analyzing to find out their possible usefulness to them is a waste of time.
Preposterous!
But why?
If the power structure
benefits the powers that be as it is, they see no reason to change it. “If it ain’t broke, why fix it,” as the
Americans would say. That new ideas should be considered rationally and
factually without being discarded a priori is still foreign to us. It should
not be.
But
in South Sudan, it is not only those in power who dismiss revolutionary ideas
before they are considered thoroughly. Even those who have been left utterly
destitute and despondent by a broken, rotten system in South Sudan still
protect it, astonishingly. These are the people unashamedly calling Deng Bol
names.
What we have failed to
learn, and I am not sure why some of us learn it and others have not, is that
you don’t have to accept a given proposal for you to treat it with the respect
it deserves. Before one dismisses and administrative or political proposal, it
is prudent, even professional, to consider its merits and flaws before
rejecting it.
Considering the merits
and flaws of any revolutionary (read bizarre) does not make you beholden
to its acceptance. It only shows that your leadership is mature, sophisticated
and resistant to superficialities.
Calling Deng Bol names or
considering his mobility issues pre-conditions for national leadership only
reflects the depravity of our society. We can reject Deng’s proposal without
descending into needless emotional paroxysm draped in ableist nonsense. We can
rubbish his ideas (not him ad hominem) by asking him to provide
political, economic and social justification for his proposal, brazen as it
appears to many of us.
I reject Deng’s proposal
for the same reason I reject ethnic federalism. That Bahr El Ghazal is the
problem is either a willful disinformation, because I do not think Deng Bol can
be misinformed about the suffering in Bahr El Ghazal, or he is using it as a
negotiation instrument not for himself but to force President Kiir and members
of his court (in a European medieval sense) to pay attention: That the country
may disintegrate.
For all the king’s courtiers
to stick their heads in the mud thinking that everything is business as usual
would have to be abandoned. If they realize Deng’s proposal is only a tip of a
gigantic socio-political ice-berg, that is.
There is a Movement in
the Equatorias
for secession. There is also a campaign by some Nuer for independence of Nuer
Nation (Rol Naath). The presence of administrative areas such as Ruweng and
Pibor is symptomatic of secessionist sentiments writ small. These are all about
discontent with someone or with some maladministration of some authority.
Before once dismisses
Deng’s proposal mindlessly, one needs to ask oneself: What has motivated Deng
to propose such a radical idea? The “why?” matters more than what happened or
what is proposed. We also need to remember that “normal” ideas have never brought
any change. Radical ideas, which become “normal” with time, bring about change.
Think about all revolutionaries! How normal were their ideas?
But Deng knows very well
that Upper Nile, Bahr El Ghazal and Equatoria have their internal problems. The
moment the scapegoat has escaped, the internal scapegoat is created. While I
agree the departure of President Kiir and some of the men around him may usher
in a possible change in our political culture, I think secession breeds other
problems. Some of the people destroying South Sudan around President Kiir are
from Upper Nile. What would we do with them once we secede?
There is therefore no
guarantee that Upper Nile as a sovereign state would be any peaceful and
developed. What has sons and daughters of Upper Nile done so far in their own
states, counties and bomas? Do they have existing social, political and
economic practices that can be considered prototypes of a prosperous sovereign
state writ small? No! Is it coincidental that all administrative areas are in
Upper Nile? No! Internal discontent!
Is Dr. Deng showing promising
signs of what Gregory Burns calls a transformative, moral leadership? No! Is
there transparency in Deng’s initiative? No! In fact, Deng has already started to
use “decrees”, a bad sign from the beginning for democracy.
But as much as I think
Deng Bol’s proposal is wrong-headed, I also believe Deng is making us rethink
some of the issues we take for granted. That is the silver lining. People
should not belong to the same country just because we think it is right,
normative. They should belong in the same country because all the elements that
make one feel like what Philosopher Robert Paul Wolff calls “a full citizen” exist.
What does this mean then?
Let us learn the art of
entertaining ideas we don’t like before we reject them. Ideas are not wrong
because we don’t like them or because they come from people we don’t like.
And I have not forgotten.
Secessionist processes can be bloody and protracted.
Of course, Deng Bol is
not ignorant of this. Political independence is never given away peacefully.
Southern Sudan (Sudan), Katanga (DR Congo), Biafra (Nigeria), Taiwan (China),
Tibet (China) and Western Sahara (Morocco) are good examples of how centers of
powers can make even a peaceful quest for independence, even on sound grounds,
bloody and terrifying.
Here is my main message.
As a country of diverse ethnic groups and political opinions, let’s get used to
the idea that citizens can table proposals, any bizarre or ridiculous ideas,
regarding how the country should be governed. We don’t have to accept them. But
we must consider them as ideas coming from fellow citizens.
Dismissing ideas a
priori is a luxury of petulant children or those who status quo is
profitable. As Machiavelli has argued in The Prince, those who are used
to immoral governance methods that benefit them see no reason for change
Taken with a more
philosophical and political grain of salt, Deng’s proposal is neither bad nor is
it good. Its results, positive or negative, depends on who operationalizes it.
We can reject it but
still use it to reflect deeply on the state of affair. Or we can use it to
think about alternative forms of government. Hasn’t federalism, or decentralization
as some politely call it, been the popular demands of the people of South Sudan
since the 1950s? Wasn’t confederation one of John Garang’s
administrative proposals?
Who governs us is irrelevant.
How they govern is all that matters.
______________________
Kuir ë Garang (PhD) is the editor of the TPR.
