Functionalizing Criticism and Diverse Political Opinions in South Sudan

When Diing Chan Awuol (Isaiah Abraham), a prominent South Sudanese political commenter, was killed in December of 2012, many of us hoped that his assassination would prompt the government’s protection of sound societal consciousness.

Unfortunately, Abraham’s death would only prove to be the beginning of the darkest chapter in South Sudanese politics, which would see an intensified war on critical voices, journalists and political opponents. Having realized what Abraham’s assassination would mean for the government’s public relations, the government promised to bring his assassins to book. So about a month later, on January 3, 2013, the then minister of information, Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin, told the nation on South Sudan Television (SSTV, now South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, SSBC) that a number of suspects had been arrested. Sadly, until this day, none of the then claimed culprits has either been indicted or brought to book.

Ironically, the government, instead, formalized its repressive agenda against freedom of speech and freedom of the press, things which are clearly guaranteed in South Sudan Transitional Constitution of 2011 (24, 1-3). In October of 2014, the parliament passed a very controversial bill, which gave South Sudan National Security agents a carte blanche in their dealing with the press and political opponents.

Having adopted Khartoum’s culture of media censorship, the National Security agents confiscated newspaper publications that criticized the government. Advertising contracts were only given to newspapers allied with the ruling party or those that toed the official party line. The usually grumpy minister of information, Michael Makuei, took it upon himself to warn journalists who attempted to present a balanced newscast to South Sudanese. Makuei accused journalists of being supportive of rebels of Dr. Riek Machar, the leader of SPLM/A in Opposition. “If you go and interview a rebel and then you come and play that material, disseminating it to the people, what are you doing?” Makuei asked. Any report that tried to seek alternative perspectives from the opposition was translated as collaboration with Riek’s rebellion. National security then intensified its targeted intimidation and arbitrary arrests of journalists and activists. This is the fate Deng Athuai, a prominent South Sudanese activist, would suffer. He would be arrested, beaten and even shot for merely criticizing the government.

In the wake of this repressive atmosphere, some news publications in Juba either ceased publication or entered into self-censorship to remain in business or benefit from advertisement dollars. Newspapers such as Al-Mijhar al-Siyasi, Juba Monitor, Nation Mirror, Bakhita Radio, which remained faithful to journalistic honesty, suffered from increased security harassment, seizures and shut-down. As George Livio of Radio Miraya languished in jail since 2014, in December of 2015, National Security Services abducted Joseph Afandi of Al Tabeer newspaper and kept him in an undisclosed location until they released him in February with neither charges nor any reason why he was arrested in the first place. And in March of this year, Joseph Afandi, again, was abducted by national security agents, beaten, burnt with melted plastic and left for dead in a graveyard where his colleagues would later find him. This is just for merely criticizing the ruling party, Sudan People Liberation Moment (SPLM). Another journalist who’d suffered arbitrary arrest by National Security is Sylvester Luati of Anisa FM, who was arrested and released shortly after.

President Kiir underscored this by warning journalists in August of 2015: “If anybody among [journalists] does not know that this country has killed people, we will demonstrate it one day, one time. ... Freedom of the press does not mean you work against the country.” This prompted a strongly worded criticism by Tom Rhodes of Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). A concerned Rhodes said that “The leader of any country threatening to kill journalists is extremely dangerous and utterly unacceptable…we call on President Salva Kiir to retract his comments immediately.” Statements like President Kiir’s make the death of five journalists in Western Bahr El Ghazal a painful remainder. Randa George Adam, Dalia Marko, Adam Juma Adam, Musa Mohammed Dhaiyah and Butrus Martin Khamis were killed in an ambush.

So what does this mean for South Sudan? Given the central place ideas and their critique play in any sociopolitical and socioeconomic development, the above repressive, official actions shouldn’t be taken lightly. First of all, no nation can develop ideologically as an institution of a single opinion. Diverse opinions and ideas need to be presented, debated, and thoroughly analyzed in order to evaluate their practical benefit to the nation. This democratic exercise, while enshrined in the South Sudan constitution, is being eliminated or threatened in the national consciousness. To expect all citizens to ascribe to a political singularity—an untested political ideal—is to subject the country to sociopolitical and socioeconomic stagnation. How do you ascertain that given ideas and ideologies aren’t working if they are not subjected to robust scrutiny?

As long as this disenfranchising climate continues, South Sudan isn’t going to benefit from the value of diverse opinions and creative capacities of her peoples. Journalists not only tell people things they need to know in order to enter national debates on important issues, they also help the government see where it goes wrong. This is imperative in sieving through what’s working and what isn’t so that the government can change course.

Joint Administration and UN Trusteeship Insulting but not Outlandish – Revisited*

"To say that these are universal problems is to assume that we are solving Africa's problems. No! This should be about our concern for South Sudan as South Sudanese. We are not Somalians or Congolese."

We are Still in a Labyrinth

In 2014, following SPLM’s leadership political indecisiveness and power struggle that’d plunge South Sudan into both political and military confrontation, the talk on UN Trusteeship or Joint Administration gained traction. But like any sociopolitical phenomenon, the idea was received with mixed reactions by South Sudanese intellectuals, political elites and policy institutes. Obviously, the reason for this mixed reaction seemed facts-based; but it’s rather a question of our general understanding of patriotism.

On March 27, 2014, I wrote an article in response to one of Sudd Institute’s ‘weekly policy briefs’ of March 11, 2014 by Nhial Tiitmamer and Abraham Awolich. And on April 11 the mentioned authors responded to my article by clarifying some of their postulates and the reason why the ‘brief’ didn’t contain thorough and comprehensive policy analysis and alternative proposals.

It’s been more than two years since then; but given the despondent state of things now in South Sudan, it’s prudent that we re-start the debate in order to remind the South Sudanese leadership of their role and the wretchedness (inadvertent or purposed) that’s become South Sudan. It’s our role as ‘learned’ and ‘informed’ South Sudanese to speak for the voiceless. It is, unequivocally, our duty to remind South Sudanese intelligentsia that criticism and the analysis of what’s wrong with the political class and the general ideological leaning, is the heart of patriotism; the pivotal center around which national well-being revolves.

While I am not going to respond to Nhial’s and Awolich’s article word by word, I am going to answer some of the questions they raised; or some of the issues they believed I didn’t address. Since this is about policy recommendations and our aspirations for South Sudan’s sociopolitical future, it’s crucial that we honestly debate the fate of the country in an exhaustively informed manner. Besides, unfortunately, the very conditions that necessitated the debate on Joint Administration and Trusteeship are exactly the same way we first debated them two years earlier or even worse. And even worse, the prospects of any better future are even beleaguer.

Insulting but not Outlandish

The authors charged that “While saying that a UN trusteeship or joint administration is insulting but not outlandish as we stated, Mr. Kuir fails to state why it is insulting.”

I used the word ‘insulting’ to underscore the fact that having our country taken over and ruled (even for a short time) by a committee of both foreigners and South Sudanese obviously gives an impression to the outside world that we are an incapable lot.  Admittedly, it’s a state of affair which, in all honesty, insults people’s sociocultural realities, their sociopolitical creative capacities, and their intellects. However, I said the two proposals aren’t ‘outlandish’ because there’s nothing strange, bizarre or peculiar about South Sudan being taken over by a different administrative body given our existing, hopeless realities. And these realities are hampering any formidable developmental path towards the South Sudan we had all hoped for. Fortunately, the authors realized that their usage of the term ‘outlandish’ was in fact inappropriate. “Perhaps it is a mistake on our side to have chosen such a word without explanation or definition. We think the two proposals are not insulting. They have been proposed out of context,” they wrote. Inappropriate or inapplicable, should have been the terms used instead of outlandish.

Falling Short of Recommending the Proposals

The other question the authors raised was the reason why I shied away from recommending the two proposals, writing that “Mr. Kuir also fails to state why he declines to recommend the two proposals.”

I see myself as a reasonable South Sudanese so I didn’t recommend the proposals by then because I believed South Sudan still had the capacity to remedy the situation and change the course of things towards the future we crave. Essentially, things don’t have to be perfect for one to believe that socioeconomic and sociopolitical situations would improve. What’s important are the indications that such a case is a possibility. With peace negotiation on-going then, I assumed a signed agreement after the military crisis would change our mindset; and that a brighter future was a possibility. We can all attest to the fact that that’s not a possibility anytime soon. That, I assume, is clear.